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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  Informal money transfers present a significant challenge to combating 
the financing of terrorist organizations worldwide.  Although the U.S. and 
other governments have implemented measures to restrict terrorist 
financing, these measures were designed to regulate formal financial 
institutions.  Accordingly, those seeking to avoid detection have turned to 
other methods of transferring money, such as commodities trades, 
hawala,1 and digital currencies.2  Many terrorist operations do not require 
large sums of money, making the detection and prevention of even modest 
transfers important.  For example, the September 11 Commission 
estimated the cost of carrying out the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, which 
                                                 
∗ William Hett earned his J.D. at the University of Iowa College of Law. 
1 Hawala refers to an ancient system of transferring money that originated in South Asia. 
The system is based on communications between individuals in different regions.  A user 
gives cash to a hawala dealer in one place who then calls a friend or acquaintance in the 
destination city with instructions to pay cash to a named recipient. The system generally 
keeps no record of individual transactions.  Instead, dealers keep track of total balances 
owed by one another, which could include multiple transactions back and forth over a 
significant period of time.  PATRICK M. JOST & HARJIT SINGH SANDHU, INTERPOL GEN. 
SECRETARIAT, THE HAWALA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE IN 
MONEY LAUNDERING (2000), 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp.  
2 Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use of 
the Internet, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 5, 3-4 (2004).  
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killed 224 people in East Africa,3 at only $10,000.4  Al Qaeda funded the 
October 18, 2002 bombing in Bali for around $20,000,5 killing 202,6 and 
the 2004 Madrid train bombings cost approximately $70,000,7 killing 
191.8  The London bombings of July 7, 2005 were estimated to have cost 
several hundred to 8000 pounds sterling (up to $15,600)9 and killed 52.10  
Even large-scale attacks with high levels of devastation are within reach of 
a well-financed terrorist group.  The September 11, 2001 attacks in the 
United States were relatively inexpensive to carry out at an estimated 
$400,000 to $500,000,11 killing approximately 3,007 people.12  The low 
financial cost of carrying out these deadly attacks necessitates a focus on 
both traditional and non-traditional methods of transferring funds. 
 
[2]  The availability and popularity of digital currencies and online 
payment processing systems have dramatically increased in recent years.13  
                                                 
3 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 70 (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.  
4 Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States, 27 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 305 (2006).  
5 JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG & SERENA WILLE, NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF 
REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 27-28 (2004), available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_terrfin_monograph.pdf.  
6 Four Sentenced for Killing Christians, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 12, 2007, at A19.  
7 Factbox-The Madrid Train Bombings and What Happened Next, REUTERS NEWS, Feb. 
14, 2007.  
8 The Madrid Bomb Trials: Historic Verdicts, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 2007, at 60. 
9 SIOBHAN O’NEIL, DOMESTIC SOCIAL POLICY DIVISION, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 
TERRORIST PRECURSOR CRIMES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 4 (2007), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34014.pdf.  
10 Some Recent Terror Attacks and Plots, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, at A12.  
11 Donohue, supra note 4, at 305. 
12 Data based on numbers collected from the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism.  National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd  (follow “GTD2” hyperlink; then select “Browse by 
Date” and insert 09/11/2008; then select “Browse by Country” and insert “United States 
of America”) (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). 
13  See Catherine Holahan, Policing Online Money Laundering: The Financial Action 
Task Force Is Developing Recommendations for International Regulations to Combat 
Financial Cybercrime, BUS. WK., Nov. 6, 2006, 
http://businessweek.com/print/technology/content/nov2006/tc20061106_986949.htm 
(stating PayPal alone processed $9.1 billion in the final quarter of 2006). 
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Some of the services currently in operation include Paypal, e-gold, Liberty 
Reserve, GoldMoney, V-Cash, 1mdc, Webmoney, IntGold, Stormpay, e-
Dinar, cashU, and BankServ.14  Some of these services require only a 
valid e-mail address to initiate an account, with the names and locations of 
the actual users unknown (or fabricated).15  Although anonymous money 
transfer services may offer opportunities for legitimate businesses to 
exchange payments with customers worldwide, they also provide an 
extremely useful tool for drug traffickers and terrorist organizations to 
transfer money with a lower risk of detection. 
 
[3]  Because of the new and unique nature of these digital currencies, 
transfers are largely unregulated and are not subject to the same 
requirements as most financial institutions.16 Normally, transfers by 
financial institutions are subject to a strict regulatory regime, which 
includes maintaining customer identification records, filing Suspicious 
Activities Reports (SARs), mandatory reporting on currency transfers of 
$10,000 or greater, and “know your customer” requirements.17  Many 
digital currency providers require no customer identification and have 
little capability or desire to detect or report suspicious activities.18  For this 
reason, such services offer opportunities for terrorist organizations to 
transfer money without the risks of using traditional financial institutions. 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Paypal, https://www.paypal.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); e-gold, 
http://www.e-gold.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); Liberty Reserve, 
http://www.libertyreserve.com/en (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); GoldMoney, 
http://goldmoney.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008 ); V-Cash, http://v-cash.com (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2008 ); 1mdc, http://www.icegold.com/1mdc.php (last visited Nov. 11, 
2008); WebMoney, http://www.wmtransfer.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); IntGold, 
http://www.aboutus.org/Intgold.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); StormPay, 
http://www.stormpay.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); e-dinar, http://www.e-dinar.com 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2008); CashU, http://www.cashu.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); 
BankServ, http://www.bankserv.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). 
15 See, e.g., Hinnen, supra note 2, at 33; see also e-gold, http://www.e-
gold.com/unsecure/qanda.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (stating that “there is no credit 
check” to open an e-gold account). 
16 See Reform Requirements for Reporting Cash Transactions: Hearing on H.R. 5341 
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of Kevin A. Delli-Colli, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security).  
17 See Donohue, supra note 4, at 372 (discussing some of these anti-terrorism 
regulations). 
18 See Delli-Colli, supra note 16. 
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[4]  True, digital currency providers operating in the U.S. have recently 
experienced heightened scrutiny and now face the prospect of tighter 
regulation.  In April 2007, the U.S. government indicted e-gold on charges 
of money laundering, conspiracy, and operating an unlicensed money-
transmitting business.19  The e-gold case highlights that U.S. regulations 
were not designed with digital currencies in mind.20  The e-gold 
defendants made plausible arguments that at least parts of their operation 
should not be not subject to the current regulatory regime.21  If the 
regulations are left unchanged, other digital currency providers could 
possibly tailor their operations to be exempt from the regulations that 
govern other financial institutions. 
 
[5]  U.S. regulation and prosecution alone cannot address the worldwide 
reach of these digital currencies.  Many digital money services maintain 
their operations outside U.S. jurisdiction.  For example, CashU is operated 
by Maktoob, Inc. in Jordan.22  Although some transfers channeled through 
banks and currency exchanges in the United States would likely be subject 
to U.S. regulation, many would not, and some of these exchangers offer 
cash card services redeemable at ATMs worldwide, including in the 
United States.23  Asserting jurisdiction for regulation of such exchanges is 
a major problem, as it is with Internet gambling.24  Thus, continued 
                                                 
19 Indictment at 1, United States v. E-gold, Ltd. et al., 550 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 
2007) (No. 07-109), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/Press%20Releases/DC%20egold%20indictment.pdf 
[hereinafter e-gold Indictment]; see also Brian Doherty, Testing Medal: The DOJ Targets 
E-gold, REASON MAG., Aug. 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.reason.com/news/printer/120955.html (stating that a grand jury indicted e-
gold’s enterprise, parent company, and three officers).  
20 See infra Part III.B.   
21 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts Two, 
Three and Four of the Indictment at 13-14, United States v. E-gold Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 82 
(D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2008) (No. 07-109) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss]. 
22 Maktoob Group, About Us, http://www.maktoobgroup.com/inside.htm (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2008). 
23 See, e.g., Cash Cards International, 
http://www.cashcards.net/rep/99152/home_page_text.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). 
24 See Ronnie D. Crisco, Jr., Comment, Follow the Leaders: A Constructive Examination 
of Existing Regulatory Tools That Could Be Applied to Internet Gambling, 5 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 155, 158 (2003) (“[t]he majority of Internet gambling businesses are located in 
tax-havens like Antigua and Belize that impose virtually no formal restrictions on these 
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International efforts are essential and will be carried out by organizations 
such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).25 
 
[6]  This article begins by describing the nature of digital currencies, how 
they work, and how a terrorist operation might use transfers of value 
through a digital currency to access usable cash in the United States or 
other target countries.  Part II discusses the current U.S. legislative and 
regulatory framework of financial institutions and how digital currency 
providers fit into this regime.  Part III examines the enforcement of U.S. 
regulations, specifically the e-gold prosecution and the use of 18 U.S.C. § 
1960 to prosecute unlicensed money transmitting businesses.  Part IV 
discusses the future of digital currencies in the United States and the 
effects of prosecutions like the e-gold case on those businesses.  Finally, 
Part V examines the problems of the current regulatory regime and the 
challenge of regulating digital currencies outside U.S. jurisdiction.  The 
article proposes that in order to better protect against the risks posed by 
digital currencies, the United States should consider the following 
measures: (1) specifically include both digital currency providers and 
digital currency exchangers in the regulations defining a “money services 
business” to subject them to regulation as “financial institutions”; (2) 
create due diligence requirements for currency exchangers that accept 
digital currencies for the purchase of ATM cash and debit cards, with the 
degree of customer identification and verification procedures increasing 
for purchases and transfers of higher values; (3) place specific per day and 
per year value limits on purchases of cash cards with digital currencies, 
and limits on the number of cash cards that each individual may purchase; 
and (4) prohibit U.S. banks and card system networks from processing 
ATM/debit payment requests from digital currency exchangers located 
abroad that deal in digital currencies. 
                                                                                                                         
enterprises.”); cf. Adrian Parke & Mark Griffiths, Why Internet Gambling Prohibition 
Will Ultimately Fail, 8 GAMING L. REV. 295, 296-97 (2004) (stating that it is difficult to 
differentiate between legal and illegal data transfers when monitoring online gambling 
and that many transfers are to Internet gambling providers registered in countries with 
limited restrictions). 
25 See infra text accompanying note 43. 
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A.  HOW DIGITAL CURRENCIES WORK 
 
[7]  Digital currencies function as an online exchange medium by allowing 
transfers of value without the use of hard currency or electronic banking 
channels.26  One of the rationales for using a digital currency is “to 
facilitate online transactions without regard for underlying currencies or 
access to foreign exchange.”27  Digital currencies serve as an alternative 
method of exchange for those conducting transactions online with known 
or unknown parties.28  These currencies are universal, sometimes tied to 
the exchange rates of hard metals, such as gold or silver, or other 
commodities.29  The digital currency provider issues the user an account, 
funded through a currency exchanger that deals in the specified 
currency.30  Exchangers accept cash, checks, credit cards, wire transfers, 
commodities, or other items of value in exchange for funding the 
customer’s account.31  Once funded, the customer accesses the digital 
currency account online and transfers the funds to another account holder 
located anywhere in the world.32 
 
[8]  Some of the existing digital currencies, or online payment processing 
systems, include Paypal, e-gold, Liberty Reserve, GoldMoney, V-Cash, 
1mdc, Webmoney, IntGold, Stormpay, e-Dinar, Cash-U, and BankServe.33  
Each of these digital currencies varies slightly in operation.  For example, 
                                                 
26 Digital Currency is perhaps the least well-known type of Internet payment system. It 
can be defined as a foreign currency with value that may be exchanged back and forth 
with U.S. dollars but which requires clearing or settlement.  A purchaser obtains funds 
for use on the Internet by converting funds from a bank account or a credit card into an 
electronic token for use on the internet.  Robert F. Stankey, Internet Payment Systems: 
Legal Issues Facing Businesses, Consumers and Payment Service Providers, 6 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 11, 22 (1998).   
27 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS 9 (2006), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/30/47/37627240.pdf [hereinafter FATF 
REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS].  
28 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., MONEY LAUNDERING IN 
DIGITAL CURRENCIES 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs28/28675/28675p.pdf [hereinafter MONEY LAUNDERING 
IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES]. 
29 Id. at 1-2. 
30 See id. at 3 & n.8. 
31 Id. at 3-4. 
32 Id. at 1. 
33 See supra note 14. 
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Paypal is tied to a bank account or a credit card and is essentially a credit 
card processing service.34  Most other services, such as e-gold, require the 
user to load the account with money before one may “spend,” or transfer, 
the digital currency to another account holder.35 
 
[9]  Those digital currencies not tied to a credit card or bank account must 
make use of a money exchange service that accepts a national currency in 
exchange for a digital currency.36  The digital currency provider itself may 
provide this service, or it may prefer to leave the business of exchange to 
others.37  Whether or not it provides this service itself may alter the legal 
requirements and regulations to which it is subject.38  These differences 
will be further discussed in Parts II and III. 
 
B.  POTENTIAL FOR UNDETECTABLE TRANSFERS, MONEY LAUNDERING, 
FINANCING TERRORISM 
 
[10]  Digital currencies afford a mechanism for money launderers and 
terrorists to transfer money internationally with a lower risk of detection 
than transfers carried out through traditional banking channels.39  
Regulations of financial institutions, such as “know your customer” 
requirements and mandatory reporting for certain transactions, make the 
detection of illegal transfers and associated criminal activity more 
probable.40  U.S. officials hinted to reporters “that e-gold is a ‘PayPal’ for 
terrorists to move cash stealthily among operatives.”41  Some digital 
                                                 
34 Brian Grow et al., Gold Rush: Online Payment Systems Like E-gold Ltd. Are Becoming 
the Currency of Choice for Cybercrooks, BUS. WK., Jan. 9, 2006, at 68. 
35 E-gold enables an individual “to spend gold as money” after opening an account by 
wiring money to e-gold or depositing money from a bank accounts, credit cards, or a 
money order.  See e-gold, supra note 15. 
36 See MONEY LAUNDERING  IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 2. 
37 See id.  
38 See infra Part II.B.  
39 See Hinnen, supra note 2, at 27, 33-35.  
40 See infra Part II, for a detailed discussion of these regulations.  See Josh Meyer & 
Erika Hayasaki, Bank Transactions Put Focus on Spitzer: Neither the New York 
Governor nor the Call-Girl Ring He Has Been Linked to Was Specifically Targeted, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at 16, for an example of how such regulations can uncover 
criminal activity. 
41 James Gordon Meek, 24-Karat Worry on the Web, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 3, 2007, at 
2. 
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currency providers allow users to maintain anonymous accounts.42  For 
example, acquiring an e-gold account takes only minutes and includes no 
verification procedure, unlike the process required by banks.43  In some 
instances, all that is needed to load money onto an account is a long 
distance phone card. 44  In addition, the existence of currency and e-gold 
exchangers worldwide makes it difficult to find out which trader or 
exchanger funded the account.45 
 
[11]  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental 
body composed of 34 member-states, compared digital currencies to 
physical cash in order to assess the risk of digital value transfer systems.46  
“Physical cash is often the ideal method of value transfer for criminal 
activity because it is anonymous, untraceable, requires no intermediary, is 
widely accepted, and provides for immediate settlement.”47  Therefore, a 
value transfer system, such as digital currency, contains a higher risk of 
being vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing activities the 
more closely it resembles physical cash.  Using cash is anonymous and 
requires no verification, customer identification, or recordkeeping.48  
Physical cash also has no limit to the amount that may be spent,49 apart 
from the physical barrier of carrying a quantity of cash.50  Major 
currencies, such as dollars and euros, have few geographic limitations, as 
they can be exchanged worldwide, while others may have a narrower area 
of acceptance.51 
 
[12]  Thus, those digital currencies that verify fewer aspects of one’s 
identity present a higher risk of being used by money launderers and 
terrorists, as they are more anonymous and more difficult to trace.52  
                                                 
42 FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 9.  
43 Jeremy Au Yong, You Can Kiss Your Money Goodbye: Net Currency System Hides 
Cheaters' Tracks As Users Are Anonymous and Payments Difficult to Track, STRAITS 
TIMES (Sing.), Nov. 12, 2006.  
44 Holahan, supra note 13.  
45 Id.  
46 FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 10. 
47 Id. at 10 n.22. 
48 Id. at 10-11 tbl.2. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 10 n.22. 
51 FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 10. 
52 See MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 3-4.  
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Likewise, those digital currencies that have a lower threshold of customer 
identification and verification and either severely limit or lack 
recordkeeping also pose a higher risk.53  For example, e-gold has been 
criticized for providing little or no verification of the identity of its users.54  
Active accounts were discovered under the names “Bud Weiser” and 
“Mickey Mouse,” indicating that no internal checks exist to verify who is 
using the service.55 
 
[13]  In the context of money laundering or financing terrorism, digital 
currencies provide a flexible and potentially undetectable method for 
funds transfers.56  As long as both parties to the transfer of value have 
accounts with the digital currency server, most digital currencies have no 
limits to the amount of value that may be transferred.57  Further, there are 
often fewer geographical limitations to the transfer of digital currencies, 
because these currencies operate over the Internet.58  Individuals may 
access their accounts and make transfers online from anywhere in the 
world. In the context of terrorism the limit is on liquidity; it is often 
difficult to convert digital funds into usable cash within the target country. 
 
C.  MECHANICS OF HOW DIGITAL CURRENCIES COULD FINANCE 
TERRORISM 
 
[14]  Using a digital currency to finance a terror attack in the United States 
or another target country would require several steps.  Transferring 
physical cash or funds from a bank account in one country, to cash or 
usable funds in the United States, necessitates both a digital currency 
dealer and a currency exchanger.59  Sometimes a digital currency provider 
will perform both functions if it accepts wire transfers or credit cards in 
order to directly fund an account.60  Other types of digital currencies, such 
as e-gold, however, require the use of an independent currency or 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 See e-gold Indictment 3-4, supra note 19, at 12-13. 
55 Meek, supra note 41.  
56 See MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 4.  
57 FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 9-10.   
58 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.  
59 FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 9.  
60 See id.  
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commodities exchanger.61  In these cases, one must pay the exchanger via 
cash, check, credit card, or wire transfer, and the exchanger will then make 
a “spend” from its digital currency account to the customer’s account.62  
The digital currency provider itself, in such a situation, only deals in 
exchanges of its own currency and does not deal with funds in any 
national currency. 
 
[15]  Examining the mechanics of a transaction at a practical level, there 
are at least several different methods through which one could transfer 
funds using a digital currency.  The first step would be to use a check, 
credit card, wire transfer, cash or other value transfer to pay a currency 
exchanger that trades in digital currencies.  Such dealers, or exchangers, 
operate in much the same way that traditional hard currency exchangers 
operate.  The exchanger accepts payment in cash (or check or wire 
transfer) and for a fee, grants the customer a quantity of digital currency 
through a “spend” from its own account to the customer’s.63  After 
obtaining the digital currency, the individual is free to transfer it 
anonymously online to someone else, who could be anywhere in the 
world. 
 
[16]  The recipient may then use various methods to convert the digital 
currency into usable money in the United States.  First, the recipient could 
use a currency exchanger to obtain hard currency in U.S. dollars.64  Such 
exchangers in the United States, however, are subject to financial 
regulations, so transfers would leave a paper trail and not be completely 
anonymous.  A second option would be to transfer the digital currency via 
wire transfer to a bank in another country that has fewer banking 
regulations and reporting requirements.  Then, with an ATM card already 
held from the foreign bank, the individual could make purchases and 
obtain dollars in cash.  This method, however, would also leave a trail, as 
withdrawing funds in the United States would reveal at least the account 
holder’s foreign bank, which is likely to have recorded customer 
information and be subject to some regulation. 
 
                                                 
61 See infra text accompanying notes 122-123.   
62 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.   
63 Au Yong, supra note 43; id.   
64 MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 2. 
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[17]  A third option would be to purchase cash cards, or gift cards, which 
are prepaid cards that function like debit or ATM cards.  Several 
exchangers provide a service of accepting digital currencies and 
exchanging them for a national currency loaded onto an ATM card.65  
These cards are generally independent from banks or credit cards, even 
though they may be associated with a card payment network such as 
MasterCard or Visa.66  The only thing required to load money onto an 
account in some cases is a long-distance phone card.67  A customer can opt 
to receive a cash card via international courier and then withdraw or spend 
the funds at any ATM or vendor that accepts MasterCard and Visa.68  
Most such cards are reloadable.69  The most common digital currency 
accepted by these service providers is e-gold.70  The level of regulation to 
which these new entities are subject in their home countries is uncertain.  
In one reported case, an individual purchased more than 300 prepaid cards 
in order to launder $2 million from the United States to Colombia.71  
 
[18]  Digital currency exchangers that issue cash or debit cards appear to 
require customers to provide only minimal personal information, such as 
names, addresses, and phone numbers.72  The extent to which these 
providers verify this information is unknown.  In addition, although ATM 
withdrawals leave an electronic trail, the cardholder and origin of the 
funds may be untraceable if the card provider is not subject to U.S. 
regulations or if what little information it has is forged or unverified.73  
                                                 
65 See, e.g., Cash Cards International, supra note 23; Express Cash Card, 
https://www.exprescash.com/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2008); E-Forexgold, 
https://www.e-forexgold.com/efx2/debit_cards (last visited Nov. 18, 2008); Digital 
Wealth Global Debit Cards, http://www.dwgcard.com/index.php (last visited Nov. 18, 
2008).   
66 See FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 4.  
67 Holahan, supra note 13. 
68 FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 4. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 9. 
71 Id. at 12.  
72 See, e.g. GoldMoney, https://secure.goldmoney.com/user/opnhld.php (last visited Nov. 
21, 2008); LibertyReserve, https://www.libertyreserve.com/en/signup/step1/index.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2008); LutLot, http://www.lutlot.com/lutlot/user/user_register.php 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2008); V-Cash, http://v-cash.com/rep/54165/create.html (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2008); Webmoney, https://start.wmtransfer.com/signup.aspx?lang=en (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2008).  
73 See id. at 11. 
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Such “open-system, prepaid cards” as termed by a FATF report, contain a 
higher risk for use in money laundering or terrorist-financed operations if 
not mitigated by account or transactional limitations.74 
 
[19]  The providers of debit and cash cards loadable with e-gold or other 
digital currencies are often incorporated in countries notorious for weak or 
insufficient financial regulations.  For example, Cash Cards International 
is incorporated in St. Kitts,75 and E-Bullion Debit Cards and E-forexgold 
are incorporated in Panama.76  FATF included St. Kitts on its list of Non-
Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) until 2002.77  Panama was 
included as a NCCT until 2001.78  Although these countries have made 
progress in financial regulations through recent lawmaking, downstream 
enforcement of these stricter regulations for financial institutions remains 
uncertain.  
 
[20]  The existence of these digital currency providers and exchangers 
outside the United States presents a higher risk than traditional transfers 
through bank accounts via wire transfers or ATM withdrawals.  The 
location of these providers means that it may be impossible for U.S. law 
enforcement to access account information under circumstances that 
would allow an administrative subpoena or search warrant within the 
United States.79  Tracking the sources of funds channeled through digital 
currencies and exchangers of these currencies is thus extremely difficult, if 
not impossible.   
 
[21]  The challenges involved with digital currency providers and 
exchangers located outside the United States are further discussed in Part 
VI.  The following section examines the current U.S. regulatory regime for 
                                                 
74 Id.   
75 Cash Cards International, supra note 23. 
76 Century City, CITY NEWS SERVICE (Los Angeles), July 30, 2008; E-Forexgold, supra 
note 55. 
77 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, ANNUAL REVIEW OF NON-
COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES 16 (2003), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/4/30/33922392.PDF [hereinafter FATF ON MONEY LAUNDERING]. 
78 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES 
AND TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLD-WIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING MEASURES 19 (2002), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/4/32/33922320.pdf.  
79 Crisco, supra note 24. 
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financial institutions.  It begins by discussing the overall goals of 
regulation.  It then briefly outlines the history of regulations in the United 
States and discusses key elements of the regulatory regime.  
 
II.  DOMESTIC REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND DIGITAL 
CURRENCY PROVIDERS 
 
A.  GOALS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
[22]  One may wonder why digital currency transactions, even if more 
anonymous than other transfers, present a greater threat to the security of 
the United States and other target countries. After all, most wire transfers 
and withdrawals from bank accounts in the United States that arouse 
suspicion are not halted.  They merely trigger reporting requirements.  
Thus, the damage, if any, is already done with the act of the transfer itself.  
But even if regulation of these traditional financial exchanges does not 
always prevent the actual funds transfer, regulation also serves another 
purpose: aiding investigations.   
 
[23]  One major goal of financial regulation is to detect and prevent the 
financing of terrorism, which means preventing potential terrorists in the 
United States (or other targeted countries) from obtaining physical cash or 
any other method of funding that allows them to carry out attacks.80  Even 
with a stricter regulation regime than is currently in place in the United 
States, however, preventing all such transfers is likely to prove 
impossible.81  Indeed, the stricter regulations now in place, such as those 
requiring financial institutions to file Suspicious Activities Reports for a 
wider variety of activity, would not be able to detect the financial transfers 
that were made by the 9/11 hijackers.82  For this reason, regulation has a 
“dual purpose,” including detection and prevention as well as aiding 
investigation after the commission of a crime.83  
                                                 
80 Donohue, supra note 4, at 304-05. 
81 See id. at 304.  
82 Id. at 396. 
83 Id. at 374.  
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B.  U.S. REGULATION OF DIGITAL CURRENCY PROVIDERS AND 
EXCHANGERS 
 
[24]  There is some ambiguity as to how digital currency providers, and 
exchanges dealing in such currencies, fit into the U.S. regulatory scheme.  
One source of confusion is that the relevant statutes and regulations 
contain differing and sometimes conflicting definitions of key terms.  For 
example, 31 U.S.C. § 5312 defines “financial institution” differently than 
the regulations at 31 C.F.R. § 103.11.  The statute lists twenty-six 
categories of “financial institutions,” while the regulations break them 
down into nine categories. 84  In the case of digital currencies, the 
differences in the definitions would not likely produce differing results.  
That is, if a digital currency is a “financial institution” for the purposes of 
the regulations, it is also likely to be a “financial institution” under the 
statute.  Both definitions include a category of any “person engaged as a 
business,” in either the statutory “transmission of funds” 85 or regulatory 
“transfer of funds.”86 
                                                 
84 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(n) (2008).  
85 The statutory definition of “financial institution” includes: 
 
 (R) a licensed sender of money or any other person who 
engages as a business in the transmission of funds, including any 
person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system 
or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the 
transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the 
conventional financial institutions system.  
 
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R).  
86 The regulatory definition of “financial institution” in 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(n) includes 
the term “money services business,” which is defined as a:  
 
 (5) Money transmitter –  
 (i) In general. Money transmitter: 
 (A) Any person, whether or not licensed or required to be 
licensed, who engages as a business in accepting currency, or funds 
denominated in currency, and transmits the currency or funds, or the 
value of the currency or funds, by any means through a financial 
agency or institution, a Federal Reserve Bank or other facility of one or 
more Federal Reserve Banks, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, or both, or an electronic funds transfer network; or 
 (B) Any other person engaged as a business in the transfer of 
funds.  
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[25]  If digital currency providers are to be subject to the regulatory 
regime, they must fall within the “money transmitter” category as “any 
other person engaged . . . in the transfer of funds.”87 The regulations state 
that the determination of whether an entity falls into the category of a 
“money transmitter” will depend on the facts and circumstances.88  This 
limitation also suggests that the mere acceptance or transfer of funds to 
settle accounts pursuant to a transaction itself will not generally subject an 
individual or entity to the regulations.89  Some have argued that this 
limitation could be used as a defense by digital currency providers,90 
although the meaning of the limitation in 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(ii) 
remains unclear as it has not yet been addressed by courts or regulatory 
agencies. 
 
[26]  Assuming a digital currency provider qualifies as a “financial 
institution,” various reporting and recording obligations apply.  The Bank 
Secrecy Act91 imposes several such obligations.  In its own words, the 
statute requires financial institutions to maintain “certain reports or 
records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or 
regulatory investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence 
or counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against 
international terrorism.”92  The Act’s justification is rooted in the idea that 
private industry, rather than government, is better able to detect illegal or 
suspicious uses of financial institutions.93  The statute requires financial 
institutions to maintain certain information regarding account owners, 
fund sources, and whether transactions are consistent with customer 
profiles.94  
 
                                                                                                                         
31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu) (emphasis added).  
87 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.11(n)(3), (uu)(5)(i)(B). 
88 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(ii). 
89 Id. 
90 Sarah Jane Hughes et al., Developments in the Law Concerning Stored-Value Cards 
and Other Electronic Payments Products, 63 BUS. LAW., 237, 262 (2007).  
91 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006).  
92 Id.  
93 Donohue, supra note 4, at 356-57.  
94 Id. at 357.  
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[27]  The USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October of 2001,95 imposes 
further measures in an attempt to detect suspicious or illegal movements 
of funds for the purpose of combating international terrorism.96  The Act 
requires the U.S. Treasury Department to promulgate regulations with a 
minimum level of customer identification measures.97  The USA 
PATRIOT Act includes enhanced “know your customer” rules that require 
financial institutions, at a minimum, to implement “reasonable 
procedures” to verify the identity of those seeking to open accounts, and to 
maintain records of information collected, including name, address, and 
other identifying information.98  The USA PATRIOT Act also requires all 
financial institutions to implement anti-money laundering programs.99  
Regulations list requirements that specifically apply to “money services 
businesses,” including among other things, procedures for verifying 
customer identification, filing reports, creating and retaining records, and 
responding to law enforcement requests.100 
 
1.  SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES REPORTS FOR MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES 
 
[28]  As discussed above, if digital currency providers and exchangers are 
to fall under the regulatory regime, it is in the “money services business” 
category.  Regulations require “money services businesses” to file a 
suspicious activities report (SAR) with the U.S. Treasury Department for 
any transaction involving aggregate funds of $2000 where the “money 
services business” knows or has reason to know that the transaction 
“involves funds derived from illegal activity”; “is designed to evade” 
reporting requirements or other regulations; “serves no business or 
apparent lawful purpose”; or “involves [the] use of the money services 
                                                 
95 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
96 Robert M. Taylor, III, Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing 
Requirements Applicable to Financial Institutions, 120 BANKING L.J. 497, 499 (2003).  
97 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2006).  
98 Id. § 5318(l)(1)-(2); Taylor, supra note 96. 
99 Id. § 5318(h)(1).  
100 31 C.F.R. § 103.125(d)(1)(i) (2008).  
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business to facilitate criminal activity.”101  The SAR must be filed within 
thirty days of detecting the suspicious activity.102 
 
2.  RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
[29]  Regulations require all financial institutions to retain records for five 
years when they are for certain transactions in excess of $10,000 including 
records of advice, requests, or instruction in any transaction that results in, 
or intends to result in, the transfer of currency or other monetary 
instruments, funds, checks, investment securities, or credit, as well as fund 
transfers that equal or exceed $3,000.103  “Additional record-keeping 
requirements apply specifically to banks, securities brokers and dealers, 
casinos, and currency dealers and exchangers.”104  The regulations require 
non-bank financial institutions to retain records for transactions in the 
amount of $3,000 or more.105  For each transfer, non-bank financial 
institutions must record the following: the name and address of the 
transmitter, the amount of the transfer, the date, the identity of the 
recipient’s institution, and if available, the recipient’s name, address, 
account number, and identifying information.106 
 
[30]  In addition, non-bank financial institutions with branches or agents 
located in the United States must retain further information for 
transactions in the amount of $3,000 or more conducted by individuals 
who are anyone other than “established customers.”107  Regulations define 
an “established customer” as a person with an account for which the 
financial institution maintains a file on the name, address, and taxpayer 
identification number (social security number, alien registration number, 
or passport number and country of issuance).108  If a person is not an 
“established customer,” the regulations require that the financial 
                                                 
101 Id. § 103.20(a)(2)(i)-(iv).  
102 Id. § 103.20(b)(3). 
103 Id. § 103.33(a)-(d); see also Andrew Chung & John Mack, Financial Institutions 
Fraud, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 555, 585-86 (2007) (discussing the record-keeping 
requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006)). 
104 Chung & Mack, supra note 103, at 586. 
105 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(f).  
106 Id. § 103.33(f)(1)(i).  
107 Id. § 103.33(f)(2).  
108 Id. § 103.11(l).  
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institution collect and record this information before carrying out the 
transfer.109 
 
3.  ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES 
 
[31]  The regulations further specify requirements for money services 
businesses. 110  Financial institutions in this category, which likely include 
many digital currency providers and exchangers, must initially register 
with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the 
Treasury Department and renew the registration every two years.111  Each 
money services business must also submit a list of its agents, as required 
by 31 U.S.C. § 5330.112  This is in addition to the obligations of all 
financial institutions, such as the “know your customer” requirements and 
those which require institutions to maintain additional records of 
identifying information for accounts involving transactions of $3,000 or 
more.113 
 
[32]  The jurisdictional requirement that the financial institution, or its 
offices, branches, or agents be located in the United States limits the reach 
and effectiveness of the regulations, especially in the context of digital 
currency providers.114  As noted above, many such businesses are 
specifically located in foreign locales that lack stringent recordkeeping 
requirements. A customer in the United States can conduct transactions 
online through exchangers who deal in digital currencies, completely 
avoiding the recording of account or transactional information, and thus 
remaining anonymous.115  Even with a wire transfer into a U.S. bank or an 
ATM withdrawal within the United States, the trail of the funds’ source 
quickly dries up at the foreign digital currency exchanger’s doorstep. 
                                                 
109 Id. § 103.33(f)(2)-(3). 
110 See generally id. § 103.41 (2008) (discussing registration requirements for money 
services businesses).  
111 Id. § 103.41(b)(1)-(2).  
112 Id. § 103.41(a)(1).  
113 See id. § 103.33 (e); see also Donohue, supra note 4, at 357 (discussing how the 
statute minimizes exposure to risk by requiring banks to “know” their customers).  
114 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(e). 
115 See generally Hinnen, supra note 2, at 1, 4-9 (explaining how the Internet can be used 
to make anonymous transactions); MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra 
note 28.   
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4.  PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND 
REGULATIONS 
 
[33]  For those subject to U.S. jurisdiction, violations of the statutory or 
regulatory reporting requirements are punishable by either a maximum 
five-year imprisonment or a maximum $250,000 fine, or both.116  In 
addition, such violations are also chargeable offenses under the federal 
prong of the unlicensed money transmitting business statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
1960.117  The statute defines “unlicensed money transmitting business” in 
three ways: (A) operation of a money transmitting business without a state 
license where the state requires it;118 (B) failure to comply with the money 
transmitting business registration requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 5330 or 
the accompanying regulations;119 or (C) transmitting funds knowing that 
they are derived from a criminal offense or are intended to promote 
unlawful activity.120  The Code carries a maximum punishment of a five-
year imprisonment.121 
 
[34]  In order to be subject to prosecution under the federal licensing 
prong of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B), a digital currency provider or 
exchanger is subject to the registration requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5330 
if it qualifies as a “money transmitting business,” which is any business 
providing currency exchange, money transmitting services, or anyone who 
“engages as a business in the transmission of funds.”122  Thus, the 
language tracks the definition of a “money services business,” defined by 
31 C.F.R. §103.11(n) and (uu).  If a digital currency provider or exchanger 
falls into this category, then failure to register with the U.S. Treasury 
                                                 
116 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2006).  
117 John D.G. Waszak, The Obstacles to Suppressing Radical Islamic Terrorist 
Financing, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 673, 686 (2005).  See generally Courtney J. Linn, 
One-Hour Money Laundering: Prosecuting Unlicensed Money Transmitting Businesses 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1960, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 138 (2007).  
118 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) (2006).  The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) 
was called into question in United States v. Barre, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1090-91 (D. 
Colo. 2004). 
119 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B).  
120 Id. § 1960(b)(1)(C). 
121 Id. § 1960(a).  
122 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
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Department appears to be a chargeable offense for an unlicensed money 
transmitting business.123 
 
III.  APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS TO DIGITAL CURRENCY PROVIDERS, 
CURRENCY EXCHANGERS 
 
[35]  The U.S. Justice Department is exploring the bounds of enforcing 
this statutory and regulatory regime, evidenced by its bringing charges 
against at least one digital currency provider.124  Those in charge of 
operating the digital currency provider e-gold have recently come under 
increased scrutiny.125  To date, this is the only digital currency provider or 
exchanger to face serious forfeitures and criminal charges.  The e-gold 
case serves as an example of how the government interprets the 
regulations (in light of their statutory basis) and who is subject to them.126  
In addition, it brings certain defenses to light that defendants are likely to 
raise in such cases.  This section uses the e-gold example as a case study 
to better understand how the United States will seek to enforce the 
regulations against digital currency providers and exchangers. 
 
A.  VIOLATIONS OF REGULATIONS, PROSECUTIONS OF DIGITAL CURRENCY 
PROVIDERS, E-GOLD CASE 
 
[36]  On April 24, 2007, e-gold, Ltd., Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc. and 
founders Dr. Douglas L. Jackson, Reid A. Jackson, and Barry K. Downey 
were indicted for money laundering, conspiracy, and operating an 
unlicensed money transmitting business.127  On July 21, 2008, the U.S. 
Department of Justice announced that each defendant pleaded guilty to 
                                                 
123 See id. § 5312(a)(2)(R) (stating that “any other person who engages as a business in 
the transmission of funds” may qualify as a financial institution); see 31 C.F.R. §§ 
103.11(uu)(5)(i)(A)-(B) (2008).  
124 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Digital Currency Business E-Gold Indicted for 
Money Laundering and Illegal Money Transmitting (Apr. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_301.html. 
125 E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 1-2.   
126 See generally id. (describing the elements of the charges brought against e-gold).  
127 E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 16; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra 
note 124. 
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one or more of the charges.128  The discussion in this article focuses on the 
charge of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business under 
federal law, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1960.  The statute criminalizes 
operation of a money transmitting business without a license (in 
jurisdictions where state law requires a license) and operation without 
proper federal registration.129  The e-gold indictment contains counts 
alleging violations of both the state and federal licensing prongs.130 
 
[37]  The general elements of the offense under the state licensing prong 
are: 1) operation of a money transmitting business; 2) that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce; 3) that is unlicensed under state law; 4) 
operating in a state that requires a license for such operation; 5) where the 
state punishes such unlicensed operation.131  Under the federal prong, the 
statute requires the same two first elements, and also requires that the 
operation fail to comply with the registration requirements under 31 
U.S.C. § 5330 or the accompanying regulations,132 or involves the 
transmission of funds “that are known to the defendant to have been 
derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to promote or 
support unlawful activity.”133 
 
[38]  For an understanding of the e-gold case, it is necessary to understand 
the distinction between a digital currency provider and a digital currency 
exchanger.  The digital currency provider maintains the online currency 
system and handles transactions between accounts online.134  The digital 
currency exchanger accepts national currencies and multiple payment 
methods and issues users a quantity of the digital currency, usually for an 
exchange fee.135  In practice, however, these roles sometimes overlap, as 
in the case of the e-gold defendants.  The e-gold digital currency provider 
                                                 
128 Digital Currency Business E-gold Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering and Illegal 
Money Transmitting Charges, U.S. FED. NEWS, July 21, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 
13724535.  
129 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(A)-(C) (2006). 
130 E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 25-26. 
131 U.S. v. Talebnejad, 460 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2006).  
132 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B). 
133 Id. § 1960(b)(1)(C).  
134 MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 2. 
135 Id. 
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is e-gold, Ltd., incorporated in Nevis,136 which handles the “roles of 
issuance and settlement.”137  The e-gold system makes use of independent 
currency exchangers, although the parent corporation Gold & Silver 
Reserve, Inc., a Delaware corporation headquartered in Melbourne, 
Florida,138 also operates its own currency exchange called OmniPay, 
described as “the primary source for e-gold exchange.”139  OmniPay is not 
currently operational after the 2007 indictment; its website indicates its 
intent to suspend new account registrations until it has complied with 
applicable federal and state regulations.140 
 
[39]  Gold & Silver Reserve was in exclusive control of the e-gold digital 
currency system from 1996 through 1999.141  In January of 2000, 
however, the issuance and settlement roles were transferred to e-gold, Ltd. 
in order “to further assure e-gold’s freedom from default risk and finality 
of settlement by dissociating the e-gold Issuer from business risks relating 
to exchange.”142  This was also likely a strategic move in an attempt to 
avoid becoming subject to the regulatory regime of financial institutions in 
the United States. 
 
[40]  E-gold, Ltd. now operates the digital currency system, whereby 
accountholders may exchange values with each other, measured in weights 
of gold.143  The system purportedly holds a fixed quantity of gold bullion 
at storage repositories “certified by the London Bullion Market 
Association,”144 and the user agreement states that e-gold “is payable to 
User, fine gram for gram, on demand, in physical gold.”145  Title to the 
gold bullion is held in trust by e-gold Bullion Reserve Special Purpose 
Trust, and the bullion may not be liquidated without the signatures of both 
                                                 
136 Nevis is located in the Caribbean Sea, near the island of Saint Kitts.  See 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sc.html. 
137 OmniPay, About Us, http://www.omnipay.com/aboutus.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 
2008).  
138 Id. 
139 OmniPay, https://www.omnipay.com/default.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).  
140 OmniPay, http://www.omnipay.com/opa2007.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).  
141 See OmniPay, About Us, supra note 137. 
142 Id. 
143 E-gold, supra note 15. 
144 Id. 
145 E-gold Account User Agreement § 3.1.1, http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/e-g-
agree.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).   
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e-gold, Ltd. and a third party escrow agent.146  Account holders “spend” e-
gold by transferring values to other account holders through transactions 
ordered online.147  These transactions are irreversible.148  The e-gold 
website states that e-gold, Ltd.. does not possess any national currency or 
bank account.149  Yet, to recover bullion storage costs, e-gold apparently 
charges “Agio fees” and “spend fees”; the latter are deducted in e-metal.150  
It is unclear how e-gold extracts this fee to pay the bullion storage facility 
if it does not maintain bank accounts.  
 
[41]  Transferring a national currency through e-gold to another party is at 
least a three step process.  First, one must pay a currency exchanger that 
accepts e-gold a quantity of national currency, or other digital currency.151  
As mentioned above, Gold & Silver Reserve’s exchanger, OmniPay, 
offered these services up until the indictment.152  Currently, any exchange 
must be carried out by independent exchangers.153  Second, the exchanger 
accepts a national currency, or other transfer of value, and issues the 
customer an equivalent in e-gold, minus a transactional fee.154  The 
exchanger affects this transfer by issuing a “spend”155 from its e-gold 
account to the account of the customer. Third, the customer is then free to 
transfer the e-gold as he or she sees fit to another account holder.156  This 
account holder may make further transfers, or could issue a “spend” to the 
                                                 
146 Defendants’ Motion to Vacate Seizure Warrant and to Modify Restraining Order and 
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing at 20, n.19, United States v. E-gold, Ltd., 550 F. 
Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. May 17, 2007) (No. 07-109) (citing to e-gold Bullion Reserve 
Special Purpose Trust ¶ 4.1, available at http://www.e-gold.com/contracts/egold-spt-
111899.htm). 
147 E-gold Account User Agreement, supra note 145, § 1.12. 
148 Id. § 2.5.1.  
149 E-gold, supra note 15. 
150 See E-gold Account User Agreement, supra note 145, § 4.3.  
151 See, e.g., http://www.asianagold.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2008). 
152 See OmniPay, About Us, supra note 137 (“OutExchange” service exchanges e-metal 
for National currency). 
153 See e-gold, supra note 15. 
154 See generally id. (referencing outside, independent exchange services which support 
the exchange of national currencies and e-gold). 
155 A “spend” is “the act of transferring value between gold accounts in fulfillment of a 
payment order entered by User.”  E-gold Account User Agreement, supra note 145, § 
1.12.  A spend is based on the weight of e-gold and title is conveyed for the specific fine 
weight of metal, and is limited to the available balance.  Id.  
156 See e-gold, supra note 15. 
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account of another currency exchanger that accepts e-gold in order to 
receive funds in a national currency.157 
 
[42]  Under the criminal charges against e-gold, the government alleged 
that e-gold, Ltd., Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc., and OmniPay together 
offered a payment processing service that constituted a money 
transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960.158  The indictment 
alleged that Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc. maintained bank accounts that 
accepted and transmitted wire transfers totaling millions of dollars, for the 
purpose of providing a digital currency exchange service.159  It also 
alleged that OmniPay collected exchange fees from customers, in return 
for issuing quantities of e-gold.160  
 
[43]  E-gold and its co-defendants made several arguments in defense, 
contending that their operation did not consist of a “money transmitting 
business” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1960.161 First, the e-gold defendants 
argued that to be a “money transmitting business,” they must have 
engaged in cash transactions.162  Since they did not accept hard currency 
or cash, they could not be a “money transmitting business.”163 
 
[44]  A violation of the federal registration requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 
1960(b)(1)(B) requires failure to “comply with the money transmitting 
business registration requirements under Section 5330 of Title 31 of the 
United States Code, or regulations prescribed under such section.”164  
Thus, the e-gold defendants turned to the registration requirements of 31 
U.S.C. § 5330, requiring a “money transmitting business” to register with 
the U.S. Treasury Department.165  The definition of “money transmitting 
business” contains three subsections: (A), (B), and (C), which are listed in 
                                                 
157 See id. 
158 E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 19.  
159 Id. at 22.  
160 Id. at 20.  
161 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 21, at 
5-9.  
162 See id. at 5-7.  
163 See id. at 8-9. 
164 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
165 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
21, at 5. 
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the conjunctive.166  Subsection (B) mentions that the business must be 
required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. § 5313.167  This statute, in turn, 
requires the filing of reports for transactions involving U.S. coins or 
currency.168  Therefore, the e-gold defendants argued that a business is 
only a “money transmitting business” when it engages in transactions of 
coins or currency and is consequently subject to the reporting 
requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313.169 
 
[45]  Alternatively, the e-gold defendants argued that the criminal statute 
was unconstitutionally vague.170  Although the statute requires that a 
defendant be subject to reporting under 31 U.S.C. § 5313, which requires a 
defendant to engage in currency transactions, 18 U.S.C. § 1960 defines 
“money transmitting” differently. “Money transmitting,” according to the 
definition in 18 U.S.C. § 1960, includes transfers by wire, check, draft, 
fax, or courier.171  Because of the ambiguity of whether the definition of 
“money transmitting” in 18 U.S.C. § 1960 controls over the definition of 
“money transmitting business” in 31 U.S.C. § 5330, the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague.172  
 
[46]  These arguments were unlikely to succeed if the prosecution had 
progressed to trial.  The statute, on its face, seems to reach conduct that 
includes facilitating transfers involving not only cash but other transfers as 
well.  It defines a “money transmitter” to include transfers of funds “on 
behalf of the public by any and all means including but not limited to 
transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft, 
facsimile, or courier.”173  The government took the position that because 
of this definition, the statute makes clear that it includes conduct beyond 
                                                 
166 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A)-(C) (2006).  
167 Id. § 5330(d)(1)(B).  
168 Id. § 5313(a).   
169 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
21, at 8.  
170 See id. at 9-11.   
171 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2) (2006).  
172 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 21, at 
10-11. 
173 See 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2).  
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cash transactions.174  It contended that the statute, on its face, is clear on 
the conduct proscribed and that it would be improper to import the 
meaning in 31 U.S.C. § 5330.175  This argument makes more sense, as 
Congress would not have included the broad types of transfers listed in 18 
U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2) if it intended the offense to be limited to the definition 
in 31 U.S.C. § 5330.  
 
[47]  The strongest argument against the e-gold defendant’s position is 
that 18 U.S.C. § 1960 does not limit the offense to failure to comply with 
the registration requirements of solely the statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5330.  
Violations may also include failure to register as required by “the 
regulations prescribed under such section.”176  This inclusion effectively 
torpedoes the e-gold defendants’ argument that a “money transmitting 
business” must engage in cash transactions.  The regulations implementing 
31 U.S.C. § 5330 clearly require registration of businesses that engage in 
all types of funds transfers, not just those transacting in cash.177  The 
regulations specifically state that “money services businesses” must 
register with the Department of the Treasury.178  “Money services 
businesses” are defined in 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu) to include: 
 
  (5) Money transmitter –  
  (i) In general. Money transmitter: 
 (A) Any person, whether or not licensed or required 
to be licensed, who engages as a business in accepting 
currency, or funds denominated in currency, and transmits 
the currency or funds, or the value of the currency or funds, 
by any means . . . ; or 
 (B) Any other person engaged as a business in the 
transfer of funds.179 
 
                                                 
174 Government’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts Two, Three and 
Four of the Indictment at 5-9, United States v. E-gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 7, 2008) (No. 07-109).  
175 See id. at 6-8.  
176 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B). 
177 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu) (2008). 
178 Id. § 103.41(a)(1). 
179 Id. § 103.11(uu)(5). 
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[48]  The e-gold operation likely satisfies 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(i)(A), 
as OmniPay accepted “funds denominated in currency” through wire and 
bank transfers in order to fund customers’ e-gold accounts, and exchanged 
out e-gold currency through such electronic transfers.  Even if the e-gold 
operation does not satisfy subsection 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(i)(A), it 
almost certainly satisfies the broader subsection 31 C.F.R. § 
103.11(uu)(5)(i)(B), which includes “any other person engaged as a 
business in the transfer of funds.”180  In either case, if the e-gold operation 
falls within the definition of a “money services business,” the regulations 
require that it register.181  It is difficult to conclude that the failure to 
register under the regulations does not subject it to liability under 18 
U.S.C. § 1960.  
 
[49]  Interestingly, the e-gold defendants never argued that they were not a 
“money services business” under the regulations.  Instead, they 
strategically chose to stay away from any discussion of the regulations, 
relying entirely on the argument that the elements of “unlicensed” and 
“money transmitting business” must be separate, and that defining “money 
transmitting business” must be uniform throughout the statute without 
regard to the three “unlicensed”  prongs under Section 1960(b)(1).182  The 
                                                 
180 Id. § 103.11(uu)(5)(i)(A)-(B). 
181 See id. § 103.41(a)(1). 
182 Defendants’ Reply to the Government’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Counts Two, Three and Four of the Indictment at 5-6, United States v. E-gold, Ltd., et al., 
550 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2008) (No. 07-109).  The statute reads: 
(b) As used in this section— 
 (1) the term “unlicensed money transmitting 
business” means a money transmitting business which affects 
interstate or foreign commerce in any manner or degree and— 
 (A) is operated without an appropriate 
money transmitting license in a State where such 
operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony 
under State law, whether or not the defendant knew 
that the operation was required to be licensed or that 
the operation was so punishable; 
 (B) fails to comply with the money 
transmitting business registration requirements under 
section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or 
regulations prescribed under such section; or 
 (C) otherwise involves the transportation or 
transmission of funds that are known to the defendant 
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defendants argue in the alternative regarding the definition of “money 
transmitting business”: it is either the case that the appropriate definition 
of “money transmitting business” is the one provided by 31 U.S.C. § 5330 
(including a requirement that the business engage in cash transactions), or 
that this criminal statute is so vague as to void it in its entirety.183 
 
B.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE E-GOLD CASE FOR FUTURE PROSECUTIONS 
 
[50]  E-gold’s indictment and prosecution helped frame the bounds of the 
U.S. regulatory regime of digital currency providers and digital currency 
exchangers.  The e-gold case was unique in several ways.  First, the same 
entity combined the roles of digital currency provider and currency 
exchanger.  Gold & Silver Reserve was essentially in control of both 
OmniPay and e-gold, Ltd., although e-gold, Ltd. operated with some 
independence.184  Second, these entities and the founders were all subject 
to U.S. jurisdiction.185  E-gold, Ltd., although incorporated in Nevis, 
apparently had records and files located at codefendant Dr. Jackson’s 
home in Melbourne, Florida.186  In addition, the e-gold website states that 
Gold & Silver Reserve serves as the “operator” of the e-gold system.187  
With Gold & Silver Reserve as a Delaware corporation headquartered in 
the United States, this would bring at least some of e-gold, Ltd.’s 
operations within U.S. jurisdiction.  Third, the government included the 
charge of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, bringing the roles of 
                                                                                                                         
to have been derived from a criminal offense or are 
intended to be used to promote or support unlawful 
activity.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b) (2006) (highlighting the E-gold defendants’ argument that the 
“money transmitting business” prong must be decided independently of the “unlicensed” 
prong) (emphasis added).  
183 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 21, at 
1, 6-11. 
184 E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 6. 
185 See id. at 18-25.   
186 Meek, supra note 41.  
187 E-gold, Corporate History, http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/aboutusdetail.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2008).  
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the digital currency provider, currency exchanger, and administration of 
each, under one criminal enterprise.188 
 
[51]  Conspiracy seemed to be a key component in the government’s case 
against the founders.  If each codefendant had a role independent of the 
other, and the digital currency provider in e-gold, Ltd. was in fact distinct 
from Gold & Silver Reserve, perhaps there could be no complete 
“business” as required by the statute.  The statute’s language, however, 
may still allow prosecution of the offense even where an entity does not 
constitute the entire “business.”  The first clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1960 
includes the language, “[w]hoever knowingly conducts, controls, 
manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an unlicensed money 
transmitting business.”189  This indicates that even an individual or entity 
that conducts and has knowledge of only part of the “money transmitting 
business” could be prosecuted under the statute.  It is not yet clear how far 
this will extend, but the potential liability is broad.  For example, is the e-
gold employee in charge of managing its information technology 
department (as small or large as it may be) also liable for managing part of 
an unlicensed transmitting business?  The few courts considering the issue 
have held that the offense is a general intent crime, requiring only that the 
defendant have knowledge as to the conduct of the factual elements, not 
knowledge of the reporting requirements or the offense.190 Construed 
broadly, this means that those who direct, manage, or supervise only part 
of an operation that later, combined with another entity, becomes a money 
transmitting business, may be subject to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1960.  
 
[52]  As for the e-gold prosecution, the government’s theory was that e-
gold, Ltd., OmniPay, and Gold & Silver Reserve conspired to form a 
jointly run “money transmitting business.”191  The defendants may have 
attempted to insulate themselves by separating the digital currency 
provider, e-gold, Ltd., from the rest of the operation.  If they could 
sufficiently separate the digital currency provider from the exchanger, they 
                                                 
188 E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 18-25. 
189 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  
190 United States v. Talebnejad, 460 F.3d 563, 572 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Keleta, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2006); United States v. Uddin, 365 F. Supp. 2d 825, 
829 (E.D. Mich. 2005).  
191 E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 18-19.  
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could argue either that the operation as a whole did not constitute a 
“business” as required by the statute, or that they did not have knowledge 
that one piece or the other was unlicensed.  The problem for the 
defendants is that Gold & Silver Reserve still operated parts of the e-gold 
currency transactional operations, and, therefore, the separation was 
incomplete.192  
 
[53]  Because of this problem, it was more difficult for the defendants to 
make the argument that e-gold, Ltd. did not know that Gold & Silver 
Reserve was unlicensed, or vice versa.  In addition, the government 
brought forward an alternative theory in the indictment.193  It alleged that 
the e-gold operation “did not require other individuals or entities offering 
‘e-gold’ exchange services to be licensed or registered as a money 
transmitting business, nor did it concern itself with the policies and 
practices of those exchangers related to the acceptance of cash or other 
funds, or the true identification of the exchangers’ customers.”194  If the e-
gold operation knew that the exchangers with whom it dealt were 
unlicensed, then this may fulfill the general intent requirement of 
“knowingly” conducting “part of an unlicensed money transmitting 
business.”195  The government would still have to prove that e-gold had 
knowledge that its services satisfied the factual elements of a “money 
transmitting business.”  Even if e-gold, Ltd. itself were not required to 
register, a showing that it knew the exchangers were themselves 
unlicensed may satisfy this element.  
 
[54]  There is some evidence in the regulations to suggest that a digital 
currency provider, particularly one tied to a commodity such as a precious 
metal, may fall under exceptions to the registration, reporting, and 
recording requirements.196  The catch-all provision of the regulations, 
which subjects a person or entity to the registration requirement, and 
defines “money transmitter” as “any other person engaged as a business in 
the transfer of funds,” is limited by the “facts and circumstances” of each 
case.197  The regulations state that “the acceptance and transmission of 
                                                 
192 Id. at 6, 21-22. 
193 Id. at 20-21. 
194 Id. at 21.  
195 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (2006). 
196 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(ii) (2008). 
197 Id. 
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funds as an integral part of the execution and settlement of a transaction 
other than the funds transmission itself . . . will not cause a person to be a 
money transmitter.”198  This could be interpreted to mean that an entity 
operating only as a commodity exchange mechanism, transmitting funds 
only for the purposes of settling accounts, is not a “money transmitter” 
and thus not subject to the registration requirement.199  
 
[55]  Thus, it might be possible for one to maintain a digital currency 
provider independently, without offering exchange services, without being 
subject to the regulations.  If the digital currency provider itself is not 
“engaged in the business” of transmitting funds as defined in the 
regulations, it would not be subject to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 
1960.200  For example, e-gold, Ltd. itself would have an argument that 
since it only charges enough to maintain storage of the gold bullion, it is 
not actually in the “business” of transmitting funds.201  Alternatively, it is 
unclear that liability would ensue for e-gold, Ltd. if the currency provider 
was entirely outside United States jurisdiction, and therefore not subject to 
reporting requirements.  Successful prosecution in such a case would have 
to prove that e-gold, Ltd. knew that the foreign entity was “engaged in the 
business” of transmitting funds.202  Also in question in such a case would 
be the knowledge of the “unlicensed” element.203  If the foreign digital 
currency exchanger is not subject to the United States’ jurisdiction, then it 
has no obligation to be licensed under law.  The question becomes 
whether it would be enough for the government to prove that the digital 
currency provider had knowledge of the factual elements that are required 
for an entity to be considered a “money transmitting business,” and that its 
own part of this overall business was unlicensed.204  Perhaps it could be a 
defense that a digital currency provider subject to United States 
jurisdiction reasonably believed that the exchangers with whom it was 
doing business fulfilled legal registration requirements in their own 
jurisdictions.  
 
                                                 
198 Id. 
199 See Hughes et al., supra note 90.   
200 See 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a). 
201 E-gold, supra note 15 (using Agio fee to recover bullion storage costs).  
202 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a). 
203 See id. § 1960(a)-(b).  
204 See id. 
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[56]  As United States regulations become more stringent and prosecutions 
more prevalent for digital currency providers and exchangers, it is 
inevitable that these entities will move, in whole or in part, to locations 
abroad with less regulation.205  In this process, several questions arise 
regarding the United States’ ability to protect against the transmission of 
funds in support of criminal activity: To what extent are digital currency 
providers and exchangers subject to United States jurisdiction if they are 
located outside the United States, but have individuals within the United 
States using their services online? In addition, what kind of international 
regulations and agreements exist to address these new methods of 
transmitting funds?  The next section examines the international nature of 
these entities and how they challenge jurisdictional limitations of financial 
regulations.  
 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
[57]  An international focus on financial regulation, specifically on 
terrorist finance, has begun only recently.206  The International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, signed in 2000, made it 
an offense to provide or collect funds with the knowledge that they would 
be used to finance terrorist acts.207  The Convention also imposed “know 
your customer” and suspicious activities reporting requirements,208 and 
has been ratified by 150 countries.209  
 
[58]  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created at the G7 Paris 
summit in 1989, has been one of the most active international groups in 
discussing and implementing measures designed to inhibit terrorist 
                                                 
205 Cf. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY vi 
(2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf (“[a]s it becomes 
more difficult to move illicit funds . . . there is a clear migration to other channels.”).  
206 Donohue, supra note 4, at 381.  
207 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 2, 
adopted Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197. 
208 Id. art. 18.  
209 OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS ON 
TERRORISM (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/83238.htm.  
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financing.210  FATF was originally designed to serve as a tool to combat 
international money laundering.211  Its mandate was later expanded to 
include creating standards to fight the financing of terrorism.  In 1990, 
FATF issued forty recommendations to combat money laundering, with 
updates occurring in 1996 and again in 2003.212  One result was the 
creation of the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories List (NCCT), 
which identifies those countries that fail to meet the regulations advanced 
by FATF.213  The forty recommendations involve increased customer due 
diligence and recordkeeping, and reporting of suspicious transactions.214  
Additionally, FATF issued nine special recommendations to combat the 
financing of terrorism, expand suspicious activities reporting, and require 
the licensing of alternative remittance systems or any entity that provides a 
service of transmitting funds or value.215  Although neither the forty 
recommendations nor the subsequent nine recommendations directly 
address digital currencies, in 2006, FATF conducted a study and issued a 
report on new payment systems, including different forms of digital 
currencies.216  
 
[59]  While none of the FATF recommendations are binding, the creation 
of the NCCT has been effective in pressuring countries to impose more 
stringent financial regulations.  For example, the initiative began listing 
countries as non-cooperative in 2000.  In reviewing 47 countries, 23 were 
listed as non-cooperative.217  As of October of 2006, no countries 
remained on the list, although the initiative continues to monitor 
                                                 
210 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, ABOUT THE FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (follow 
“About the FATF” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 19, 2008). 
211 Id.  
212 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, The 40 Recommendations, (2003), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org (follow “40 Recommendations” hyperlink). 
213 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, About the Non-Cooperative Countries and 
Territories (NCCT) Initiative, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236992_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 19, 
2008). 
214 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, The 40 Recommendations, supra note 212.   
215 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist 
Financing (TF), (2004), http://www.fatf-gafi.org (follow “9 Special Recommendations” 
hyperlink). 
216 See FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 1. 
217 FATF, About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative, supra 
note 213.  
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progress.218  Despite these efforts and successes in persuading countries to 
enact stricter regulations, the porous nature of the Internet and electronic 
communications still presents enormous challenges to combating the 
financing of terrorism.  The Internet, by its own nature, defies regulations 
that are confined to a geographic nation-state; individuals can access 
websites from anywhere in the world, thereby making effective regulation 
difficult.219  
 
[60]  As the United States continues to transition from legislation and 
regulations designed to combat money laundering to a regime that also 
effectively combats terrorist financing, there are two main areas of focus.  
First, the United States must examine its regulations of digital currency 
providers and currency exchangers that are located in the United States, or 
subject to its jurisdiction.  Second, it must focus on what it can do to 
prevent the use of digital currency providers located abroad to transfer 
funds that can be accessed and spent within the U.S. to carry out terrorist 
operations.  The following section discusses current U.S. regulations of 
digital currency providers and exchangers, offering suggestions to bolster 
this regime and lower the risks posed by digital currency transactions.  
Part VI follows with a discussion on what the U.S. can do to mitigate the 
risks posed by those digital currency providers and exchangers located 
outside its jurisdiction.  
 
V.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO LOWER THE RISKS OF DIGITAL 
CURRENCIES 
 
A.  MEASURES TO LOWER THE RISK OF DOMESTIC CURRENCY 
PROVIDERS/EXCHANGERS 
 
[61]  In order to implement sufficient domestic financial regulations it is 
useful to analyze the risk posed by digital currencies by analogizing to 
cash transactions.220  Those engaged in illegal activity prefer to use cash 
when possible because it is “anonymous, untraceable, requires no 
intermediary, is widely accepted, and provides for immediate 
                                                 
218 FATF, Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/4/0,3343,en_32250379_32236992_33916420_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
219 See MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 1. 
220 See supra Part I.B. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 2 
 
 35
settlement.”221  In a 2006 report, FATF identified characteristics of digital 
currencies that increase the risk that such currencies will be used to 
finance terror operations.222  Digital currencies pose a higher risk where 
they (1) afford a higher level of anonymity; (2) have no limit on the 
transaction size; (3) leave no traceable record; (4) have a wide range of 
funding methods; (5) have no geographical limit; and (6) have no limit to 
what they may purchase, or no limit on their transferability to hard cash.223  
Regulations should be aimed at reducing or eliminating each of these 
risks.224   
 
[62]  First, the regulations should specifically apply to digital currency 
providers.  As discussed above in Part III.B., a digital currency provider 
that does not offer exchange services currently may fall under an 
exception to the regulations and escape registration, record-keeping, and 
reporting requirements.225  Under the definition of “money transmitter” in 
31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu), the regulations suggest that acceptance and 
transmission of funds to settle an account, in connection with the sale of a 
commodity or other instrument of value, alone will not cause one to be a 
“money transmitter.”226  To eliminate this possible loophole for digital 
currency providers, the regulations should specifically include them in the 
definition of a “money transmitter.”  This could be accomplished by 
broadly defining “money transmitter” to include, for example, “any person 
engaged in maintaining an online funds transfer system.”  If the Treasury 
Department desired to exempt certain businesses, such as those connected 
with securities or other property, it could specifically list these types of 
businesses as exempt.  In addition, retaining the language, “engages in the 
business” for this category provides another loophole for companies like 
e-gold, Ltd., which claims it does not operate for profit, but merely 
charges a small exchange fee for the purposes of covering the bullion 
storage costs.  Eliminating the “engages in the business” requirement from 
the digital currency provider category would ensure coverage of these 
entities.  
 
                                                 
221 FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 10 n. 22.   
222 Id. at 10-11 tbl.2. 
223 Id. at 10-11.  
224 See id. at 18 for a list of current and potential risk mitigants.   
225 See supra Part III.B.  
226 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(B)(ii) (2008).  
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[63]  After making all digital currency providers subject to the regulations, 
one can consider whether the current identification and verification 
requirements are sufficient for the “money services business” category.  
Currently, “money services businesses” must implement minimum 
procedures for verifying the identities of all customers.227  The regulations 
provide more specific guidelines for transactions of $3,000 or more.228  
Non-bank financial institutions must record the name and address of the 
transmitter, the date and amount of the transfer, identity of the recipient’s 
institution, and the recipient’s name, address, account number, and 
taxpayer number (such as social security number, or passport number).229  
Although the regulations outline strict recording requirements for 
transactions of $3,000 or more,230 they are vague as to the customer 
verification required for lesser transactions.231  It would be better to 
specifically define what information is required for all customers, such as 
providing name, address, and phone number, and requiring the money 
services business to verify the information by contacting the customer 
through one of these means.  Regulations should also require money 
services businesses to maintain records of the information in addition to 
verifying it, to ensure its availability for possible investigations.  
 
[64]  Customers are currently limited as to the amounts transferred from 
one U.S. digital currency account to another based on the information they 
must furnish for transactions of $3,000 or more.232  Regulations could 
further lower the risk posed by digital currency transactions by placing 
limits on the methods used to convert the digital currencies to cash, such 
as on the issuance of cash cards by currency exchangers, or on wire 
transfers cashing out digital currency accounts. Use of a check or wire 
transfer would route the transaction through a bank, and thus, trigger the 
regulations required of banks.233  The use of a cash card, however, would 
not, as the entity in charge of issuing the card is responsible for setting the 
                                                 
227 Id. § 103.125(d)(1)(i)(A).  
228 Id. § 103.33(f). 
229 See id. § 103.33(f)(2) (requirements for those “other than established customers”); see 
id. § 103.11(l) (requirements for “established customers”). 
230 See id. § 103.33(f). 
231 Id. § 103.125(d)(1)(i)(A) (2008).  
232 See id. § 103.33(f)(1).  
233 See id. § 103.33(e). 
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limits to its use.234  For any exchange using a cash card, regulations should 
require the recording of the same information as for transactions of $3,000 
or more, making it more difficult for individuals to remain anonymous.  
 
[65]  Another possibility would be to place a value limit on cash cards, 
and per day and per year limits on spending, as well limits on the number 
of such cards an individual may purchase. For example, the EU has 
implemented regulations exempting issuers of cash cards from due 
diligence requirements, as long as those cards abide by certain value 
limitations.235  A card issuer need not take measures to identify customers 
purchasing non-rechargeable cards of 150 Euros or less, or rechargeable 
cards with a yearly charging limit of 2,500 Euros and a yearly spending 
limit of 1,000 Euros.236  
 
[66]  Europe’s limits on cash cards do not consider the source of the 
electronic money loaded on the card.237  The threshold limits, below which 
the issuer is exempt from due diligence requirements, seem to be designed 
more for gift card applications.  For example, a store that issues such 
cards, redeemable only at its own stores, would not want to be burdened 
with collecting identifying information for each card sold.  The risk of 
illegal use is also lower for these limited-use cards.238 Unfortunately, 
Europe’s exemption would also apply to cash cards issued by a currency 
exchanger that redeems digital currencies.  These cards are higher risk 
because they can be loaded online and redeemed at any ATM.239  Thus, 
they should be subject to more stringent regulations and they should not be 
exempt from due diligence requirements.  
 
[67]  The goal of regulating digital currency providers and exchangers is 
to set limits that allow customers the freedom to utilize new, innovative 
methods of transferring funds, while at the same time lowering the risk 
that such methods may be used to finance terror operations or other illegal 
                                                 
234 See, e.g., Visa Reloadable Prepaid Card: FAQ, 
http://usa.visa.com/personal/cards/prepaid/reloadable_prepaid_card_faq.html#anchor_12 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2008).  
235 Council Directive 2005/60, arts. 7, 8, 11(5)(d), 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15, 23-25 (EC). 
236 Id. art. 11(5)(d), at 24-25. 
237 See id. at 25. 
238 FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 4, 13.   
239 See id. at 11-12. 
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activities.240  The United States should consider placing further limits on 
cash cards issued by currency exchangers that accept digital currencies.  
These entities should not be exempt from the due diligence requirements 
entirely, as most transactions will likely occur online instead of in person.  
A graduated system would best maintain the balance between customer 
freedom and management of risk.  As the amount of value on the card 
increases, the recording and due diligence requirements should also 
increase.  Purchases of cards with values of $3,000 or higher should be 
subject to a higher standard of customer identification and recordkeeping.  
This would be consistent with the current regulations for other financial 
institutions, which require additional measures for transactions of $3,000 
or more.241  
 
B.  MEASURES TO LOWER THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNATIONAL 
DIGITAL CURRENCY PROVIDERS AND EXCHANGERS 
 
[68]  With increased regulation in the United States and increased 
enforcement through prosecutions like the e-gold case, digital currency 
providers and exchangers have an incentive to move to locations abroad 
with more favorable laws.242  Although FATF has worked toward 
pressuring countries to enact minimum financial regulations, there are still 
jurisdictions which have fewer regulations and less stringent 
enforcement.243  International efforts remain important to eliminate 
loopholes that may allow digital currency providers to operate in an under-
regulated environment.   
 
[69]  As already mentioned, financial regulations have the dual purpose of 
preventing illegal money flows and creating a paper trail for later 
investigations.244  It will likely be impossible to detect and prevent all 
transfers of funds intended to support terror attacks in the United States 
without placing a significant burden on the financial sector and on 
                                                 
240 See supra Part II.A.  
241 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(f) (2008).  
242 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.  
243 See FATF Statement on Certain AML/CFT Deficiencies, FATF E-NEWS, Mar. 2008, at 
2, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/42/37/40305148.pdf; see also FATF 
REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 17 (discussing the differences of 
laws and regulations within the jurisdictions). 
244 See supra Part II.A. 
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innocent citizens who transfer funds every day.  It is equally important, 
however, that a paper trail exist so that investigators can later use records 
in conjunction with other evidence to vet potential suspects more quickly.  
The recording requirements and customer verification information could 
be vital to efforts to locate an individual before an attack occurs.  
 
[70]  The greatest threat that digital currency providers and exchangers 
outside U.S. jurisdiction pose is an anonymous avenue for individuals to 
acquire usable funds within the United States.  Digital currency providers 
such as e-gold pose a greater threat when they move abroad where they 
are able to avoid the U.S. regulatory regime.  Individuals can access the 
Internet from anywhere in the world, transfer funds via a digital currency, 
and convert the account into usable funds through a cash card service.  
This mechanism of transferring funds into the U.S. would thwart the 
current U.S. financial checks that are meant to detect and prevent, or at 
least document, questionable transfers that might be used to finance terror 
operations.  An individual could visit several different ATMs using one or 
more cash cards, withdraw the maximum amount allowed, and within a 
short time period extract several thousand dollars worth of cash without 
having any personal information recorded and without leaving a paper trail 
in the United States.   
 
[71]  The United States could better protect itself against such transfers in 
several ways.  First, as the EU has done, the United States could place 
limits on the issuance of prepaid cash cards by U.S. financial institutions, 
including maximum loading limits, per day and per year spending limits, 
and limits on the number of cards that an individual may purchase.245  If 
the issuance of a cash card exceeded the limits, it would be subject to due 
diligence, recording, and reporting requirements.  Second, the U.S. could 
prohibit U.S. financial institutions from issuing prepaid ATM/debit cards 
for international currency exchangers dealing in digital currencies that are 
not subject to U.S. regulations.  This measure would be more difficult to 
enforce, however, and would likely require a U.S. regulatory agency to 
identify and publish the names of blacklisted foreign issuers of cash cards.  
 
[72]  Third, the U.S. could prohibit financial institutions that operate 
ATMs and merchant banks in the U.S. from honoring transaction requests 
                                                 
245 See supra notes 234-237 and accompanying text.  
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from international currency exchangers and banks that have issued prepaid 
ATM/debit cards in exchange for digital currencies.  This proposal is more 
complex and requires a brief discussion of how debit and ATM 
transactions function.  An ATM/debit card (or cash card) transaction 
generally involves three players: an issuing bank or entity (business 
abroad issuing the cash card), a cardholder, and the acquiring bank (bank 
in the United States operating the ATM).246  This discussion focuses on 
those transactions where the cardholder uses a PIN, the most common way 
to extract physical cash from an account.247  The focus of this article is on 
the danger presented by the anonymous transfer of funds from abroad to 
usable cash in the United States.  In such a scenario, an individual in the 
U.S. inserts a cash card into an automated teller machine (ATM), 
requesting cash.  The U.S. bank or institution operating the ATM sends an 
authorization request through a card system network (such as Maestro, 
Cirrus, or Star) to the issuing bank or institution.248  When the issuing 
institution of the cash card grants authorization, the ATM dispenses the 
requested cash, and settlement between the banks or institutions may 
occur immediately or at a later time.249  The individual receives the cash 
anonymously, without customer information being verified or recorded.  
The loophole occurs where the issuer of the card is outside the United 
States, beyond the regulatory regime’s jurisdiction.  Although both the 
institution operating the ATM and the card system network may be subject 
to U.S. jurisdiction, they have no information about the cardholder, and 
the only information recorded is the amount of withdrawal and the foreign 
issuing bank or institution.  
 
[73]  A solution to prevent such an anonymous transfer would be to 
require those entities subject to U.S. jurisdiction, the institution operating 
the ATM or the card system network, to either obtain and record sufficient 
                                                 
246 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND DEPARTMENTAL 
OFFICES, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, NOTICE OF JOINT PROPOSED RULEMAKING: 
PROHIBITION ON FUNDING OF UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/noticeofproposedrule.pdf [hereinafter 
PROHIBITION ON FUNDING OF UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING]. 
247 Debit card transactions may also be processed like a credit card, through payment 
networks such as Mastercard or Visa.  Such a transaction would also include a fourth 
player, the merchant.  See id. 
248 FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 26-27.   
249 PROHIBITION ON FUNDING OF UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING, supra note 246. 
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customer information in the authorization process, or to altogether deny 
requests for withdrawals from foreign currency exchangers that issue cash 
cards. One concern is that this approach might impose too large a burden 
on U.S. financial institutions to obtain such information or to keep track of 
foreign entities, for which they must refuse to honor transaction requests.  
Yet, the United States has already convinced many banks to voluntarily 
decline to process certain transactions in the Internet gambling context. 250  
This indicates that it is possible for banks to selectively decline 
transactions from specific entities.  In the case of online gambling, 
merchants are required to code customer purchases; this allows credit card 
companies to decline charges that reference gambling codes.251  The 
concern is that merchants may cheat and code charges as something else, 
or route them through another merchant.252  The most effective 
mechanism would be to prohibit honoring transactions altogether with 
foreign currency exchangers that accept digital currencies and issue cash 
cards.  To enforce such a system, the U.S. Treasury Department, or other 
government agency, would have to maintain a list of such currency 
exchangers.  Regulations would require U.S. banks operating ATMs to 
periodically update their systems to reflect blacklisted foreign entities.  
Although the precise mechanics and implementation of this potential 
solution are beyond the scope of this article, it is a solution that regulators 
and those in the banking industry should discuss.  The goal of the above 
proposed measures is to protect against anonymous transfers of funds 
without overburdening consumers or the banking industry.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[74]  Digital currencies and exchangers dealing in such currencies present 
a risk to the United States and other nations if the applicable regulations 
remain ambiguous.  Allowing users of digital currencies and prepaid cash 
                                                 
250 Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities 
Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 435 
(2006); Andrea L. Marconi & Brian M. McQuaid, Betting And Buying: The Legality of 
Facilitating Financial Payments for Internet Gambling, 124 BANKING L.J. 483, 496 
(2007).   
251 I. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D. OWENS, JR., INTERNET GAMING LAW: GAMBLING AND 
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when they change coding in an attempt to evade detection.  See id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 2 
 
 42
cards to take advantage of these services without identification or 
customer verification requirements increases the risk of exploitation by 
money launderers and those seeking to finance terrorism.  The first step 
will be to tighten U.S. regulations as they apply to digital currency 
providers and currency exchangers, especially those offering prepaid cash 
cards.  
 
[75]  The e-gold case highlights other potential legal issues surrounding 
the regulation of digital currencies.  Specifically including digital currency 
providers in the “money services businesses” category would foreclose 
many of the arguments made by the e-gold defendants and others that such 
businesses are not subject to prosecution under the unlicensed money 
transmitting business offense.  In addition, the “engages as a business” 
exception should not apply to digital currency providers, as long as the 
definition makes it clear that individual liability would ensue only for 
operating or maintaining a currency system, and not simply for using such 
a system.  These measures to regulate domestic operators of digital 
currencies should be relatively uncontroversial and simple to implement.  
 
[76]  The greatest challenge of digital currencies is their tendency to 
transcend jurisdictional boundaries, making effective regulation difficult.  
International cooperation through organizations like FATF will be critical 
in addressing this and many other challenges.  In addition, the United 
States should consider taking steps on its own to protect against the risks 
presented by digital currencies.  These may include requiring banks that 
operate ATMs and accompanying card system networks to honor only 
prepaid cash cards issued by financial institutions licensed in the United 
States and dishonor transaction requests from unlicensed institutions.  
 
[77]  Successfully protecting against the risks posed by digital currencies 
and other new payment methods will require ideas from regulators, 
domestic financial institutions, foreign countries and entities, and 
international organizations.  The risks of digital currencies cannot be 
mitigated by domestic efforts alone.  It is increasingly important to work 
within the framework of multilateral institutions, such as FATF, as newer 
technologies and fund-transfer methods evolve.  The goal of regulating 
these new technologies should be to mitigate the risks posed by potential 
criminal uses without completely stripping consumers of the legitimate 
benefits that these technologies offer.  Digital currencies provide 
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consumers with an additional method of exchange, but left unchecked, 
such currencies have the potential to be exploited by money launderers 
and financiers of terrorism.  Regulators should increase their awareness of 
digital currencies and work together with the banking industry and 
international partners to address the risks posed by these new fund-transfer 
methods. 
